November 21, 2025

Friday. Left around quarter to two. Nikor. Almost cold, sunny skies, light winds from the southwest. Sun already low, and still some leaves on trees to be illuminated. Biltse Rading to de Bilt, then Bilthoven. School letting out, so very different from a Sunday morning. Airfield fairly quiet, then Soesterhoogt from both sides and to the Zeisterspoor. The woods acquiring their winter look, but with the sun it wasn't dreary. Laan 1914 and Hugo de Grootlaan, then Soesterweg to Hilhorstweg. The view of the church in Soest. The light on the fields. Just a few people on the Eng, and the train rolling alongside to the right. Houses and apartment buildings on the way to Wieksloterweg, there a right, toward the non-stop rush-hour traffic on the Soestdijkerweg. Den Dolder would have been better, although on a Friday afternoon, it's hard to find a quiet road here anywhere. The repaved Lindenlaan to Groenekan. Home in the fast-fading daylight. The news full of Washington's latest push for peace in Ukraine. It's all depressingly familiar, particularly the starting point of "ending the war." Let's make it something abstract: two parties fighting--why, and why don't they stop? Unless you start talking about the kind of war this is, it's never going to end in a durable peace negotiated by the two belligerents. It remains impossible for the White House to accept that this is a Russian war of aggression, meant to end Ukraine's existence as an independent state, and that in itself it is part of a larger, zero-sum campaign against the West and everything it stands for (for better or for worse). That contest will go on in case of a Ukrainian defeat. As someone once said in a similar context: "it cannot be otherwise." It's possible, of course, that the administration understands this full well but just doesn't care for Ukraine, its people, and the wider implications of what under the current proposal would be a solid Russian victory. But if you care for Ukraine and what its struggle represents, the only durable way to end this war is to achieve enough military set-backs and economic hardship for Russia to cause a regime change in Moscow. Ironically, if one of Washington's motives for trying to broker an end to the war is the dealmaking that could follow it, with Kyiv as well as with Moscow, then backing Ukraine to the hilt could well achieve that goal. A new, less imperial-minded, Kremlin would somehow have to be engaged, maybe even actively supported. The long-suffering people of Russia certainly deserve better lives than they have now. The current proposal won't get us anywhere close, because many, likely most, Ukrainians will never accept it. The current crisis is depressingly familiar also for what it suggests about Europe's role. It's not just that, as the main funders of Ukraine's war effort, the Europeans weren't really consulted by the Americans. More serious is the question whether, in spite of all the professions of unceasing loyalty to Ukraine, European leaders that matter are willing, and if so, able, to increase their economic and military support should the U.S. pull back and Moscow press on with its terror campaign. Right now, and following Zelensky's lead, European governments call the U.S. proposal a starting point for further negotiations. That is surely an effort to try to avoid alienating Washington, and it has worked before. For all we know, by the end of next week the president will again enter one of his phases in which he is "very disappointed" with his colleague in the Kremlin. But if this time it's a real ultimatum and Ukraine rejects it, will European leaders be willing and able to mobilize their societies for quasi-war, as surely they will have to? They may be willing; whether they can succeed amid a shadow war and a public relations campaign (both ongoing for years already) by Russia and its useful idiots in the West is very much an open question. Many Europeans may feel uneasy with the drones, the incursions, the provocations; just as many are still inclined to believe that it's really all the result of our policies: expanding NATO, supporting Ukraine, sanctioning Moscow. If we only stopped doing these things, if we stopped "threatening Russia," the whole problem would go away. We would somehow be able resume "normal" relations with Russia (and, supposedly, it with us), we could just live our lives as if the outside world didn't exist. Russia's real war in Ukraine and its shadow war against NATO countries are bad enough, but the toughest battle may be at the European home front.