October 19, 2025

Sunday. Left a little after 9:30. Blacksmith. Crisp, dry fall morning, many cyclists wearing full gloves, although also several still in shorts. Moderate winds out of the southeast under uneven, gray-white cloud cover. The sun did good things with that. Marsdijk and Achterdijk, with some wildflower borders still showing signs of life. Werkhoven to Tuurdijk and Nachtdijk. Headwinds cooler than they have been in a long time, but not really cold, so a very good morning. The river and its banks beautiful, green; the water with some movement but few boats. A few small sails visible in the marina outside of Culemborg. Tailwind and a group to Vreeswijk, then the old waterfront before and after Nieuwegein. ARK to Gele Brug, and into the city to Mos. Yesterday's paper with Friday's confirmation: there will be no Tomahawks for Ukraine for the time being. All it takes is just one phone call for the whole charade to start again. We can look forward once more to an in-person meeting between the Russian and American presidents. The former knows exactly what he wants, and how to get it; the latter not so much, other than domination of the news cycle at home and abroad. For his part, the Ukrainian president walks the tightrope of not alienating the White House while doing damage in Russia and holding his nation together. His European neighbors should help him where they can and keep explaining to their own voters how this is an efficient way to promote their own security too. There are too many Europeans who still believe that the war isn't really their problem, and that if it ended and/or we would talk to the Kremlin, we could just get on with our lives. There would not be any trouble between us and the Russians. This kind of thinking is implied in retrospective criticism of Western policies in the 1990s: if we had not expanded NATO, we would not be where we are with the Russians now. The only way to make that argument is to ignore Russian aspirations and Russian developments after 1991. There is much to say on this subject of the origins of the new cold war (as there always has been on the start of the original Cold War). In fact, quite a few specialists have done so, with perhaps new revisionists (critics of Western policies, as opposed to those who see Russia as the main problem) gaining traction. As with the original Cold War, for our current East-West conflict it may be most useful to see vast differences in outlook right after the Cold War, on top of chaotic, uncertain, and uncontrollable Russian developments. A key question for today's debate then becomes one that's actually pretty old, namely the extent to which one could have built one's policy on the assumption that Russia at that time (or at any time) could be made to fit within a European order they way other major countries (say, Germany, France) did so. That's not only a question of power, it's also a question (as it has been since Peter the Great) of ideas and principles. During the 1990s the integration of Russia was a highly uncertain proposition at best and thus not one on which to base your policies as a Western leader. In making this point, you can allow for Western self-confidence ("hubris" would be taking it too far). There were also the legitimate needs of Eastern and Central Europan countries to take into account--closer to home, and much further along in transforming their societies into open and democratic ones. With them, the West could try to build something on the basis of shared, fundamental principles much more easily than with a semi-autocratic Russia waging war (Chechnya) against some of its own people. And it has, by and large. There's much more to say on this subject, and more is to come.