Leaving It All Out On The Course

Opening weekend of the road season in Belgium, for many the real start of the season (forget the Majorca, Qatar, and even Besseges races). Yesterday (Omloop Het Nieuwsblad) was fine and nice to look at, but today's Kuurne-Brussels-Kuurne was something else. Brutally harsh weather with rain and wind all day. If you weren't able to watch it on Flemish tv, you can read up on it, for example here. You can also watch some clips, if they play where you are. The thing I wanted to highlight is the way two of the three breakaway riders looked and sounded after the race. Winner Bobbie Traksel seemed fine. But he had won, and he really was the strongest of the day. But Rabo's Rick Flens, second, and especially Brit Ian Stannard just looked terrible in the post race interviews, to the point where you had to worry about their long-term well-being. If the clip connected to Stannard's name plays (look for "Reactie Stannard" on the left-hand side here), you may get some idea. He's barely able to talk, looking almost desperate from the cold. Afterwards, I watched him on the podium. He had to go out first, having finished third, and he looked absolutely miserable. He tried to acknowledge the crowd and the well-wishers, but he wasn't really there. And this after having fought valiantly during the race, having done his share at the front and also having attacked several times in the finale. He really did leave it all out on those miserable, wet and windy Flemish roads today.

Afghanistan and Dutch Cabinet

Did the Dutch Social Democrats opportunistically bring down the Dutch cabinet at the expense of their country's reputation within NATO, NATO's mission in Afghanistan, and the people of the Uruzgan region where Dutch troops have operated fairly successfully since 2006? How did it happen, and what does it really mean? I've seen two papers so far today, de Volkskrant and Trouw, and two pieces in particular stood out for me: first, the interview with the leader of the PvdA, the Social Democrats, Wouter Bos in de Volkskrant. Pushed on his party's role in the government's sollicitation of a formal NATO request earlier this month for some kind of extension to the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, he uses the convenient but ultimately, shall we say, unconvincing term "misunderstandings" to explain what happened. He also hides behind his man in the foreign ministry: development minister Koenders, who, he implies, handled this matter on behalf of the Social Democratic ministers. Maybe foreign minister Verhagen thought concrete discussions in the cabinet about an extension would only be possible if there was a formal NATO request, Bos says, maybe he had gotten the impression somehow that this was the PvdA position. But if he did, he was wrong. There certainly could not have been any doubt about where the Social Democrats stood on Uruzgan, he says. Or was there? Everyone knows that NATO doesn't submit these kinds of formal requests if it's not clear there will some kind of positive response. It is unlikely that the foreign minister would have asked NATO for a formal request had he been under the impression that the Social Democrats would categorically reject any kind of extension for the Uruzgan mission (although the Volkskrant criticizes the foreign minister for probably misrepresenting the Dutch political situation to NATO).

We won't know for sure until we get to read the files, for example of the cabinet meetings at the beginning of February, but for now, I'm with Johan ten Hove, long-time writer for Trouw this morning. He describes a fictious discussion two weeks ago between three officials, all named Wouter Bos: the political leader of the PvdA, the minister of finance, and the vice-prime minister. The political leader is in charge: we'll bring down this cabinet by standing "on principle" i.e. the initial decision in 2007 to make the current Uruzgan mission the last round because that's politically useful for us right now. The ministers Bos protest a little: we've just asked NATO for a letter; it would be irresponsible in times of financial and economic crisis to bring down a government this way--but the political leader wins out. Final question from one of the ministers Bos: what will become of the people in Uruzgan? Uruzgan? Those people don't vote in our elections, do they?

This gets us to the bigger question of what really happened here. It seems obvious: narrow domestic political considerations won out over all other relevant questions in this matter. It does not matter for the PvdA that Dutch troops have worked, and fought, really hard for years in Uruzgan at great personal sacrifice and that they've been fairly successful given the circumstances. (Other piece in today's Volkskrant: the local population will hate to see the Dutch go: "the Taliban may come back.") The fact that the work and sacrifice of years may be wasted by a complete withdrawal--as opposed to, say a more gradual draw-down during which another alliance member and local Afghan forces could be prepared to take over--doesn't matter to the Social Democrats. It does not matter to them either, professions of sympathy and friendship notwithstanding, that a new U.S. president has decided to make a new, hard push to turn things around in Afghanistan in preparation for a draw-down, and that he has asked America's allies to stand by him. We're your friend, sure, just don't ask us for anything. The Social Democrats apparently do not care either about what a withdrawal as a lead-nation in an important sector of Afghanistan will do to the willingness of other member countries to stick this out.

The really sad thing is that in the first opinion poll since the fall of the cabinet, the Social Democrats have gained some ground. Ultimately, therefore, this is about more than the PvdA's decision to pursue its own perceived narrow self-interest. This whole affair may also be a reflection of a growing scepticism among the population at large toward the Afghanistan mission, NATO, and the alliance with the U.S. With the leadership they've been getting lately, that may still be disappointing, but it can't really be a surprise.

Afghanistan Takes Down Dutch Government

This is the news out of the Hague this weekend, although the full story is more complicated. But it's true: last week there emerged an irreconcilable conflict between the Social-Democratic and Christian-Democratic members of the government over a NATO request to consider keeping Dutch troops in Afghanistan in some capacity beyond their current mandate, scheduled to end later this year. Both Christian Democratic parties in the cabinet of Prime-Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende (the guy who looks a little like Harry Potter) were willing to consider the NATO request (backed by considerable U.S. pressure), the Social Democrats were not. They pointed especially to a vote in the parliament last fall, confirming that the current mission in Uruzgan would end in 2010 as scheduled. They're also down in the polls, losing a lot of ground to the populist PVV (anti-Islamist Geert Wilders) and the more left-of-center Socialist Party, and must have decided that it was vital to take a clear stand and stick with it. Interesting detail, however, is the origins of the NATO request, which the foreign minister, backed by Balkenende and others in the cabinet, insists was discussed and approved by the cabinet ahead of time. They seem to be right. In other words, before NATO sent its request, it had verified that the response would be positive, that there was a willingness in the Hague to find some way to extend the mission in Afghanistan. But in parliament last week, prior to the cabinet meeting where the NATO request would first be discussed, Social Democratic leader and vice prime minister Wouter Bos openly rejected this call, thereby not only pulling the rug out from under this government, but also going back on his word. I think Bos decided to play it really hard (and possibly a little below the belt) by luring his coalition partners into the trap of the NATO request, and next take a stand on principle. He must have known what the NATO soundings about a possible formal request meant, after all.

The arguments against a further Dutch presence have at times included the alleged pointlessness of the mission, the need for a Dutch policy independent of the U.S., and the "fact" that the Dutch have been there long enough and that it's time for someone else to step up. But Afghanistan wasn't the only reason for the break. People who know Dutch politics much better than I do, and who have been following this government from its start three years ago, point out that this had become a dysfunctional group that agreed on less and less. Infamously, when it became clear last year that significant budget cuts will be necessary due to the economic crisis, all this government was capable of was to form about twenty working groups of high-level civil servants to come up with some proposals later in 2010. Talk about abdicating your responsibility to govern, to make the tough decisions. More recently there was an independent report on the extent of the Dutch support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2002-03--quite strong, although without direct military involvement--which criticized the government at the time (also led by Balkenende). Because the prime minister initially did not show enough contrition in their view, the Social Democrats pushed things to the verge of a crisis then also. So the causes are complex and also have to do with the political instability and disorientation that has plagued this country since at least 2002, when the out-of-nowhere politician (and some would say: populist) Pim Fortuyn was murdered right before an election he was poised to win. Later there was the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a domestic Islamic extremist, and since a few years we have Wilders, a kind of Fortuyn wanna-be, although coarser and more opportunistic. Every unhappy country is unhappy in its own way, but the Netherlands does seem to resemble other Western democracies in the volatility of its politics and, especially, the lack of faith people have in politicians' ability (or even commitment) to address important problems.

Still, foreign affairs has played an important part. While opposition to foreign interventions or peace keeping missions isn't massive, it is considerable, and it is growing. Furthermore, influential voices openly question the alliance with the U.S., arguing instead that the Dutch should put all their security eggs in a European basket. This of course raises the key question, and it's not a new one: does the Netherlands--does Europe, really--have an alternative to some form of alliance with the United States? Should it even want one, even if Europe ever became capable of acting in a unified way in international politics (not something anyone old enough to be able to read this will experience in their lifetime)? It says something, though, that serious people are perfectly happy not just to raise this illusion as an option, but to advocate for its realization here and now. I think it testifies to a deep-seated, though not always openly acknowledged, anti-Americanism (regardless of who runs the government in Washington). In addition, a serious dose of wishful thinking about the possibilities of the EU has to be part of it too. It's not that one can't be convinced that Europe eventually will have to come together, also in foreign and defense matters, what's troubling is the kind of either-or thinking that seems to inform these arguments: just get rid/out of NATO, and we'll be on our way. I'm well into a new post now, although all this stuff is connected. I'll have to continue it at some later date.

Another Hooky Ride, Finally

The weather has been bad, although it's been good for winter sports. This, winter sports, caused a problem two weeks ago, when I took a hard fall on the Amsterdam speedskating oval and separated my shoulder a little ("piano key injury"). The ice was bad that morning when we got on, and two showers consisting of a wintry mix of snow, rain, and sleet turned it into a very rough sandpaper. The stuff just seemed to freeze to the surface. Instead of getting off, I decided to do a few more laps, started to get very sloppy in a turn, and took myself down. I might as well have fallen off my bike, because there was absolutely no sliding of any kind. First I hit my right shoulder, then I did a kind of salto (someone who watched it told me later) to land on my knees (which were bloody and bruised). After that, I just lay there--no smooth sliding to the outer lane, hoping not to take anyone else down with you. It hurt, and after putting some ice on it (and taking a shower during which I sighed and swore a lot) we went to the emergency room where the x-ray showed a mild case of separated shoulder. (When I signed in, they still had my name, address, and phone number on file from when I had knee surgery there in 1985). That started almost two weeks of doing nothing, except keeping my arm in a sling part of the time and going for walks. But in week 2 things started to feel better, and when I saw the doctor, he spoke the now famous words: "if it doesn't hurt, do it." A little ride last Saturday to see how it felt, and today the roads were clean enough for a first 21 miler. It really didn't feel that unusal, considering that it was also only just above freezing with a decent breeze. I did my usual hooky loop (Vreeland, where the skating course looked just fine, Loenersloot, Abcoude, Weesp) and it took a little longer than normal, but a 17 m/h average isn't horrible. It felt very nice to be back outside, moving.

Defending Obama

It needs to be done, if only to point out that he's hemmed in from many sides, not the least of which is the U.S. political system, broadly defined. The U.S. is a presidential democracy, but this doesn't mean the president can just order everyone else around, at least not for very long. How do you get legislation passed? With enough votes, obviously. What do you need to assemble these? You certainly need a certain amount of courage, a willingness to stand up for what you believe is right, the determination to take charge--call it what you want. Lyndon Johnson had all these things in spades. But more important was his ability to wheel and deal, to persuade members of Congress to vote his way. There's overlap between the two, but in the end it's about taking the political situation in Washington and the mood of the country (very different today from that during the 88th and 89th Congress), and combine it with your own vision in a way that gets some concrete and effective legislation to your desk. Now, about this country, it's essentially conservative, right-of-center, anti-government (even though most rely on the government in one way or another--who ever claimed politics was rational or logical?). That goes for the current Congress too, in spite of the Democratic majorities. And this hard-to-pin-down popular "mood"? People want things done, but primarily in the area of employment, especially their own. Many people may not think things through, and quite a few are susceptible to mainstream media manipulation. But that's at the heart of the current political environment. I'm cutting corners left and right here, I know. Leftist critics of the president should not be insulted by members of the White House staff, but I think they're wrong to imply that if only Obama had put his foot down last year, he would have signed health care reform legislation and a climate bill months ago. Does that mean Obama cannot be criticized? Of course not. Leadership does matter in politics, and perhaps he should have been more aggressive. But I for one believe it would not have brought these bills to his desk any faster--on the contrary.

Speaking of aggression--that's of course part of the criticism of his anti-terror policies. "Assassin-in-chief," as some say. Too aggressive, possibly counter-productive, also with the drones in the Pakistani tribal areas. In parts it's also in contempt of the Constitution. Of course, LBJ, the president praised for getting historic civil rights legislation, Medicaid and Medicare, and many other reforms passed, also murderously escalated the war in Vietnam. Furthermore, his "Rolling Thunder" campaign of terror against North Vietnam wasn't unconnected to the escalation practiced by JFK (with chemical warfare in the South rather central to it)--another president coming in for some cautious praise by those advocating the social-democratization of the U.S. (not that there necessarily would by anything wrong with that--except that it would be un-American in a literal, not rhetoric, sense). But that aside, I'll just point to the fact that Obama did not initiate these policies, just like, for example, he did not believe the U.S. should have intervened in Iraq. But is he withdrawing precipitously from that country? Of course not, he can't. It's much easier to get into these things than to get out. I think it's the same with the Bush anti-terror policies, especially the way the government claims it needs to deal with terror suspects or known terrorists who mean the U.S. and its friends great harm. JFK once told the historian David Herbert Donald that no-one who had not been at that oval office desk ought to presume s/he could grade a president. In one way, that's a profoundly undemocratic statement, but in another way it contains an important truth too often pushed aside. To cut to it: do I think Obama would like to make (further) changes in the Bush-Cheney anti-terror policies, especially their (il)legality? I do, but I don't think that's so easy, in part because of the way Cheney--aided by Fox News, Bill Kristol, and all his other allies-- himself the past year has assembled a stab-in-the-back legend ready to be rolled out at the time of the next successful terrorist attack against the U.S. The climate of fear in the U.S. since 9/11 may be out of proportion with the actual threat (especially relative to other harmful domestic and international developments), but it's very real, and politically it's both explosive and poisonous. You may be able to change some of these policies, but you'd better be extremely careful in proceeding.

Finally, there's another way to look at this "assassination" issue, namely as a fairly conventional act of war, albeit in the context of a rather unconventional war. If you consider yourself at war, in part because someone else has declared war on you, you get to take out members of enemy forces who are out to harm you. It's more that a little shady in the current war on Al Qaeda and affiliated groups, but that's primarily because of the way these groups have chosen to wage their war. Not only is it a-symmetrical warfare (can't really blame enemies for choosing that general approach against the U.S.), it relies on terror and behind it is also the motivation of the suicide-bomber--i.e. it cannot be appeased in any way. (I don't believe a total withdrawal by the U.S. from the Middle East would end this, even if this was in any way practical). But indeed: who on our side decides, and how, who needs to be taken out in the other camp? The government's record in identifying genuine, fanatical and dangerous terrorists suggests that Cheney's One-Percent Doctrine continues to motivate people, and it's obvious there's much more harm than good in that. But I'd still be reluctant to do away with at least the theoretical possibility that the commander-in-chief, charged with maintaining the security of the U.S., has this option.

The Buck Does Stop At His Desk, But ...

Here's a comment (slightly edited) I posted at Martian Utopia Cafe, whose author in turn had linked to a recent Glenn Greenwald post about the troubling continuities between the "war on terror" policies of the past and current administrations. Obama too (he's the head of this government) reserves the right to label people, including Americans, terrorists, not share any evidence, and yet assassinate them. Does this make him like Cheney? Some would say, essentially, yes, and they're scathing, maybe even withering, in their criticism of the president. Here's what I wrote:

I won't scathe, because as your Jon Stewart post also shows, there's too much of that right now. Also, it sounds too much like "skate," and I just separated my shoulder doing that. I read Greenwald, and he's often hard to resist. Still, I'm balking at the Obama-Cheney analogy. It just doesn't fit, it's taking a more than legitimate opposition to an existing policy one or two steps too far. The policy exists, and the buck stops at Obama's desk, so ultimately it's his. But I feel the following also matter: it's an inherited policy; it's a policy that has become the co-property of the vast government intelligence and national security apparatus; it's a policy in the politically most sensitive area: the "war on terror," an area where the new administration (it's still relatively new) has been making some (not enough!) significant improvements; and I'm not willing to ignore that this war is an extremely unconventional and dirty one where in some cases it may be necessary to deal with an enemy in an unconventional way (i.e. assassinate, rather than capture and try him). In short, while I'm unhappy with the implications of the policy, I'm trying also to figure out why it's still in place, perhaps giving the president too much benefit of the doubt (maybe I also had lower expectations of him, or of his ability to change a lot of things overnight by executive order or otherwise). He's operating in a tough bureaucratic environment, and he's operating in a dysfunctional political environment (poisoned, also, by Cheney and his stooges). He also now is responsible for fighting off the Islamist terrorists, and he gets to see a lot more intelligence than the rest of us. I understand that in regard to the latter point, the traditional government "trust us" argument no longer works, and yet I'm willing to believe that the current administration acts in good faith. Cop out or "real world," I just cannot see it otherwise than as extremely complicated. I certainly would not want to be in Obama's shoes (another cop out?). If in two years time policy in this area was exactly as it is today, I might feel different, but for now I'm going to give him a little more time.

Obama After Massachusetts

I have other stuff on my mind, which I will get to, but for now just my latest op-ed, written after watching the President's State of the Union last Thursday morning. What does it say? Massachusetts is a set-back. Politics isn't fair: you work hard to avoid a new Great Depression, and succeed, but because job growth lags, the focus is on unemployment and debt, and you increasingly get blamed. There was the campaign from the right. But there was also the leeway for the Democrats in Congress, probably too much. And there was the expansion of the role of government, necessary perhaps, but never popular, least in time of huge deficits. The State of the Union speech? Primarily a sincere call for everyone in Washington to start acting like responsible adults. Health care reform? If the Democrats don't pass it now, their troubles will only deepen, as will popular distrust of the integrity and effectiveness of the national political process. Too easy on the president? Could be, but who/what else: Boehner? Pelosi? Palin? Gimme a break. In het Eindhoven's Dagblad, yesterday (in Dutch).