Russia: Bad News Bear

I finally finished last week's special report in The Economist on Russia. It tries to end on a hopeful note: "Historically, Russia has often demonstrated an ability to take unexpected turns, whether for good or ill. ... The danger lies in its unpredictability. Yet that may also be a reason for hope." The problem is that the series of thorough articles on issues such as the growing power of the state in the economy; corruption; the not-so-independent judiciary (guess who has undue influence?); depressing demographic trends; xenophobia; and the Caucasus--the entire bunch, really, offers very little to base one's hopes on for a more benign Russian future. The depressing prospects domestically and in foreign policy are captured at the end of the article on demographics, immigration, and xenophobia: "Dmitry Rogozin, a nationalist politician who built his campaign for parliament in 2003 on anti-immigrant rhetoric, is now Russia's ambassador to NATO. On his office wall hangs a portrait of Stalin." Angry, frustrated places, just like angry, frustrated people, do not tend to be nice to themselves or others. What makes this especially complicated for the "West" (that is to say: "Europe" and North America) is that according to the same report "Russia's nationalism defines itself in relation to America and the West ..." It matters a great deal, therefore, how the West treats Russia, and the Economist also reports that "many Russian liberals argue that Western policy towards Russia has helped to make the country more nationalistic." [emphasis mine]: U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty; missile defense in Central Europe; NATO expansion; recognition of Kosovo. Once conclusion could be that the West should avoid anything that will make Russia mad. However, going that route (with all the cost it will entail for Western interests elsewhere) does not guarantee by a long shot a more benign Russian policy. What does the experience of the Cold War teach us here? The way a country is run--by whom and in the name of what--matters a great deal; real change will have to come, therefore, from within; outsiders can do some limited things to help (vis-a-vis the population, but sometimes also by working with the regime), but their actions will always have to be based on a realistic assessment of how, in this case, Russia is run--by whom and in the name of what.